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Abstract. We consider a fixed-price mechanism design setting where
a seller sells one item via a social network, but the seller can only di-
rectly communicate with her neighbours initially. Each other node in the
network is a potential buyer with a valuation derived from a common
distribution. With a standard fixed-price mechanism, the seller can only
sell the item among her neighbours. To improve her revenue, she needs
more buyers to join in the sale. To achieve this, we propose the very
first fixed-price mechanism to incentivize the seller’s neighbours to in-
form their neighbours about the sale and to eventually inform all buyers
in the network to improve seller’s revenue. Compared with the existing
mechanisms for the same purpose, our mechanism does not require the
buyers to reveal their valuations and it is computationally easy. More
importantly, it guarantees that the improved revenue is at least 1/2 of
the optimal.
Keywords: Mechanism Design · Fixed-price Mechanism · Information
Diffusion · Social Network.
1 Introduction
Social networks play a vital role in our daily activities, especially in electronic
commerce. How to utilize social networks for promotions is widely studied by
both researchers and practitioners [5]. Mechanism design on social networks, aim-
ing to establish specific policies satisfying some desirable properties, has received
much attention from the fields of economics, computer science and artificial in-
telligence [2].
The fixed-price mechanism has been the mostly applied trading rules for
a seller to sell products in our daily life. The seller sets a fixed price before
the buyers buy the product and a buyer would buy it if the price is not over
her valuation for the product. Due to its simplicity, there does not exist much
research on it [7].
However, determining an optimal price under a fixed-price mechanism is still
challenging. If the seller aims to maximize her revenue, she could find the optimal
price given the number of buyers in the market and their valuation distributions.
We will show that the number of buyers can significantly influence the seller’s
revenue. Specifically, even under fixed-price mechanisms, the more buyers par-
ticipating in the mechanism, the higher revenue for the seller. Therefore, the
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seller is incentivized to promote the sale to attract more buyers to increase her
revenue, even if there is only one item to sell.
This paper aims to design a novel fixed-price mechanism to help the seller to
attract more buyers via a social network. We assume that the seller is located
on the social network and she can sell the item with a fixed-price mechanism to
her neighbours without promotion. We want the seller’s neighbours to help her
attract more buyers from their neighbours. However, her neighbours would not
do so without giving them a proper incentive (why should they bring competitors
for the item). The goal of our mechanism is to design such an incentive for the
neighbours to invite more buyers.
A similar problem has been studied recently in [6,15] where they proposed
an auction with a dedicated payment scheme to attract more buyers via a social
network. The payment requires the whole structure of the network and also
the valuations of all buyers, while our proposed mechanism is fixed-priced and
computationally easy with a guaranteed revenue improvement for the seller.
Our mechanism is also inspired by the mechanism with rewards used by the
MIT Red Balloon Challenge Team to win the 2009 DARPA Networks Compe-
tition sponsored by a research organization of the United States Department
of Defense [11]. The challenge is to locate 10 balloons located at undisclosed
locations across the U.S.. With the dedicated rewarding scheme, the MIT team
only began with four initial participants but eventually attracted over 5,000 par-
ticipates and won the challenge. We extended this rewarding scheme into our
mechanism to incentivize buyers to invite their neighbours.
As closely related work, fixed-price mechanisms have also been investigated
in other mechanism design settings [14,12]. Goldberg et al. used an optimal fixed
pricing as a benchmark for evaluating the expected revenue of single-round and
sealed-bid auctions [4]. Emek et al. analyzed the properties of the well-known
geometric reward mechanism that incentivizes the participation for multi-level
marketing [3]. McAfee showed under the condition that the buyer’s distribution
dominates the seller’s distribution for a bilateral trade, a fixed-price mechanism
gets at least half of the maximum social welfare gain from the trade [8]. Badani-
diyuru et al. presented a constant-competitive fixed-price mechanism for online
procurement markets with sub-modular utility [1].
However, to the best of our knowledge, no work has considered introducing
information diffusion into fixed-price mechanisms. Thus, in this work, we propose
a novel mechanism by integrating the merits of both fixed-price mechanism and
information diffusion. Our fixed-price diffusion mechanism distinguishes itself
with the following.
1. It helps the seller to attract more buyers via social networks without paying
them in advance.
2. It does not require buyers to reveal their valuations. The payments for buyers
are relatively fixed and computationally easy.
3. The seller’s revenue improvement is guaranteed and it is bounded above half
of the optimal.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model of
our study. Section 3 investigates the traditional fixed-price mechanism. Section 4
defines the proposed Fixed-price Diffusion Mechanism. Section 5 studies the
properties of the proposed mechanism and we conclude in Section 6.
2 The Model
We consider a market where a seller s sells one item via a social network. We
assume that the social network is a rooted tree, and the root is s and there
are k other nodes in the tree denoted by K = {1, · · · , k}. The k other nodes
are the potential buyers of the item sold by s. Each agent i ∈ K has a set
of neighbours denoted by ni ⊆ K\{i}, and she can only exchange information
with her neighbours. Each buyer i ∈ K has a valuation vi > 0 for the item. We
assume, as suggested by Myerson, buyers’ valuations are independently derived
from the uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1] [9].
Without any advertising, the seller s can only sell the item among her neigh-
bours since she can not communicate with the rest buyers from the network di-
rectly. Fixed-price mechanisms have been widely applied for this kind of market
due to their simplicity. However, determining an optimal fixed-price is challeng-
ing. Moreover, the more buyers in the market, the higher chance to sell it with
a higher fixed-price. In order to attract more people to buy, the seller s may pay
third-party platforms to promote the sale. This is often very costly with no guar-
antee to improve the revenue. Therefore, in this paper, we consider another class
of fixed-price mechanisms which can improve the seller’s revenue by attracting
more people to buy. It achieves this by incentivizing buyers to propagate the sale
information to all their neighbours, instead of by the seller’s advertising through
other platforms. At the same time, it does not require buyers to report their
valuations as standard fixed-price mechanisms would do.
Since our mechanism does not require buyers to report their valuations, the
action of a buyer is just diffusing the sale information to their neighbours. Let
ni be the type of buyer i ∈ K, (n1, · · · , nk) be the type profile of all buyers and
(n1, · · · , ni−1, ni+1, · · · , nk) be the type profile of all buyers except i. Let a′i = n′i
or nil be the action of i, where n′i represents the neighbours informed by i and
nil represents that i has not been informed or she does not want to participate
in the sale. Furthermore, let a′ = (a′1, · · · , a′k) be the action profile of all buyers
and a′−i be the action profile of all buyers except i.
Definition 1. Given the type profile (n1, · · · , nk) of all buyers, an action profile
a′ is feasible if for all i ∈ K,
– a′i 6= nil if and only if i can be informed the sale information from the seller
following the action profile of a′−i.
– if a′i 6= nil, then n′i ⊆ ni.
Let F((n1, · · · , nk)) be the set of all feasible action profiles of all buyers. The
mechanism is defined only on feasible action profiles.
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Definition 2. A mechanism in the social network consists of an allocation pol-
icy pi = (pii)i∈K and a payment policy p = (pi)i∈K , where pii : F((n1, · · · , nk))→
{0, 1} and pi : F((n1, · · · , nk))→ [0, 1] are the allocation and payment functions
for buyer i.
In the above definition, given the action profile a′, pii(a′) = 1 indicates that
i receives the item whereas pii(a
′) = 0 means that i does not get the item.
pi(a
′) > 0 indicates i pays pi(a′) to the mechanism whereas pi(a′) < 0 means i
receives |pi(a′)| from the mechanism.
Next, we introduce the desirable properties we want to design for the mech-
anism.
Definition 3. An allocation pi is feasible if for all a′ ∈ F((n1, · · · , nk)),
– for all i ∈ K, if a′i = nil, then pii(a′) = 0.
–
∑
i∈K pii(a
′) ≤ 1.
A feasible allocation cannot allocate the item to a buyer who does not join the
sale and it should not allocate the item to multiple buyers. In the rest of the
paper, only feasible allocations are considered.
Given a feasible action profile a′ and a mechanism (pi, p), the utility of i is
defined as
ui(a
′, (pi, p)) = pii(a′)vi − pi(a′).
A mechanism is individually rational if, for each buyer, her utility is always
non-negative no matter how many neighbours she informs.
Definition 4. A mechanism (pi, p) is individually rational (IR) if ui(a
′, (pi, p)) ≥
0 for all i ∈ K, for all a′ ∈ F((n1, · · · , nk)).
In a standard fixed-price mechanism, a mechanism is incentive compatible
if and only if for each buyer, reporting her truthful action is a dominant strat-
egy [10]. In our model, the action of each buyer is diffusing the sale information.
Hence, incentive compatibility means that for each buyer, diffusing the sale in-
formation to all her neighbours is a dominant strategy.
Definition 5. A mechanism (pi, p) is incentive compatible (IC) if ui(a
′, (pi, p)) ≥
ui(a
′′, (pi, p)) for all i ∈ K, for all a′, a′′ ∈ F((n1, · · · , nk)) such that a′i = ni.
In this paper, we design a fixed-price mechanism that is IC and IR, which
encourages the buyers to diffuse the sale information without being rewarded in
advance. More importantly, it gives the seller a nearly optimal revenue.
3 Fixed-price Mechanism without Diffusion
As we mentioned in Section 1, fixed-price mechanisms are widely used due to
their simplicity. However, like many other traditional mechanisms such as the
well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, the seller only sells the
item among the people she can communicate with [13].
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Given the model defined in Section 2, we can give a brief description of the
fixed-price mechanism for selling one item as follows.
Fixed-price Mechanism without Diffusion
1. The seller sets a fixed price p ∈ [0, 1] and informs it to all buyers.
2. The buyers whose valuations are greater than the fixed price p claim to
buy the item.
3. The seller selects one of them who claimed to buy (with random tie-
breaking), gives the item to her, and receives the payment p from the
buyer.
4. If no one claims to buy the item, the seller keeps it.
In order to get higher revenue, the seller can optimize the price of p in the
above mechanism. Theorem 1 shows that if the seller knows how many buyers
participating in the sale, there is an optimal fixed price for her to maximize her
revenue.
Theorem 1. Under the fixed-price mechanism without diffusion, given the num-
ber of buyers x in the market, the optimal fixed-price to maximize the seller’s
expected revenue is popt = ( 11+x )
1
x , which is an increasing function of x.
Proof. Since the valuations of all buyers on the item have the independent and
identical uniform distribution U [0, 1], the probability that a buyer’s valuation
vi < p equals P (vi < p) = p, and the probabilty that all of the buyers’ valuations
are smaller than p equals px, which is also the probability that the item is not
sold. So, the probability that the item can be sold is 1 − px with the seller’s
revenue being p. Thus we get the seller’s expected revenue
E = (1− px) · p
and its derivative with respect to p is
dE
dp
= 1− (x+ 1) · px.
By letting dEdp = 0, we get the optimal fixed-price,
popt = (
1
1 + x
)
1
x . (1)
Hence, the seller’s maximum expected revenue is
Ebase = (1− (popt)x) · popt = ( x
1 + x
) · ( 1
1 + x
)
1
x . (2)
Let y = ( 11+x )
1
x , then ln y = − 1x ·ln(1+x). Therefore d(ln y)dx = (1+x)·ln(1+x)−xx2·(1+x) .
By (1 +x) · ln(1 +x)−x > 0, which is easy to prove, we have d(ln y)dx > 0. Having
a positive derivative, ln y is an increasing function of x, and so is y. uunionsq
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Furthermore, since x1+x is an increasing function of x, we conclude that Ebase
is an increasing function of x. That is more buyers participating in the fixed-price
mechanism, more expected revenue for the seller.
Now, we consider an extreme case of the network, where all buyers are the
seller’s neighbours. In this case, the maximum of the seller’s expected revenue
under the fixed-price mechanism is Eopt = (
1
1+k )
1
k · ( k1+k ), where k is the total
number of buyer in the network.
If x is the number of neighbours of the seller s, then Ebase and Eopt define
the lower bound and the upper bound of the seller’s expected revenue under our
diffusion mechanism that we propose next.
4 Fixed-price Diffusion Mechanism
In the fixed-price mechanism discussed in Section 3, the seller sells the item
only among her neighbours ns. However, the seller will obtain higher expected
revenue if the number of participants increases. Therefore, in this section, we
design a mechanism, called fixed-price diffusion mechanism, to incentivize the
seller’s neighbours to diffuse the sale information to their neighbours for the
seller to increase the number of participants.
Our mechanism will iron the conflict between the seller aiming to improve
her revenue and the buyers unwilling to diffuse the information to bring more
rivals.
Before introducing our mechanism, we need some extra notations. Given the
tree-like social network, let dj be the depth of buyer j ∈ K and PHj be the set
of all buyers except j on the path from the seller to j. We assume that the seller
has x neighbours and let ns = {1, · · · , x}. In addition, we call a subtree rooted
at each i ∈ ns a branch and denote the set of the buyers in branch i with Xi,
the cardinality of Xi with ki, and the number of the rest buyers in the network
except branch i with k−i(i = 1, · · · , x). Without loss of generality, we assume
k1 ≥ k2 ≥ · · · ≥ kx. As a final notation, α ∈ [0, 1] is a factor, which is used to
adapt the amount of the rewards in the proposed mechanism.
Our mechanism is defined as follows.
Fixed-price Diffusion Mechanism (FPDM)
Given the buyers’ action profile a′ ∈ F((n1, · · · , nk)) and α ∈ [0, 1], com-
pute the number of buyers in each branch, for each branch i (i = 1, · · · , x),
by substituting x in Equation (1) with k−i, fixed price p
opt
i (a
′) = ( 11+k−i )
1
k−i
is defined for all the buyers in branch i if they receive the item.
– Allocation:
1. Starting from i = 1, while i ≤ x, repeat the following:
The seller informs all buyers in branch i of the price popti (a
′).
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(a) Those buyers in branch i whose valuations are greater than or
equal to popti (a
′) claim to buy the item.
(b) If there are multiple claimers, the seller picks the one with the
smallest depth. If there are multiple such claimers, select the one
with the largest number of neighbours to allocate the item (with
random tie-breaking). Allocation ends.
(c) Otherwise, set i = i+ 1.
2. If the item is not allocated in Step 1, the seller keeps it.
– Payment: If the item is allocated to a buyer j in branch w, then for
each buyer l ∈ K, her payment is
pl(a
′) =

poptw (a
′) if pil(a′) = 1
(pbase − poptw (a′))α( 12 )dl if pil(a′) = 0
and l ∈ PHj
0 otherwise
where pbase = (
1
1+x )
1
x is the optimal fixed price to sell among ns.
Obviously, popti (a
′) is irrelevant to all the buyers in Xi. That is to say, p
opt
i (a
′)
is independent of buyers’ action, which will be used in the proof of the IC of our
mechanism.
Intuitively, if no buyers want to buy the item, then the seller keeps the item;
Otherwise, the seller first selects the branch with the largest number of buyers
to sell the item. Later in this branch, among those whose valuations are higher
than the fixed-price, the seller allocates the item to the buyer who is closest to
the seller and of the most neighbours (with random tie-breaking). The recipient
of the item pays her payment to the seller.
Unlike in the fixed-price mechanism defined in Section 3, here the payment
varies with different branches.
Figure 4 illustrates the proposed mechanism with an example. The seller s
sells an item. There has three branches denoted by branch 1, 2 and 3. X1 =
{1, 4, 5, 6, 10}, X2 = {2, 7, 8}, X3 = {3, 9}. Then popt1 (a′) = 0.699, popt2 (a′) =
0.743, popt3 (a
′) = 0.760. The valuations of all buyers from number 1 to number
10 are assumably given to be v1 = 0.6, v2 = 0.7, v3 = 0.7, v4 = 0.5, v5 = 0.8, v6 =
0.9, v7 = 0.3, v8 = 0.4, v9 = 0.1, v10 = 0.5 respectively. The seller first selects
branch 1 since it has the largest number of buyers. Then in branch 1, according to
v5 > p
opt
1 (a
′), v6 > p
opt
1 (a
′), we know only buyer 5 and 6 can buy the item. Since
d5 = d6 = 2, and since buyer 5 has one neighbour and buyer 6 has none, the seller
allocates the item to buyer 5. We can work out that PH5 = {1}. At the same
time, we get the seller’s revenue generated by our mechanism is popt1 (a
′) = 0.699
and d1 = 1. Following the fixed-price mechanism defined in Section 3, we know
that buyer 2 receives the item. Therefore pbase = (
1
4 )
1
3 = 0.630. We let α = 0.1.
The payments of buyer 1 and 5 are −0.00345 and 0.699 respectively. So the
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s
1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8 9
10
Fig. 1. Illustrating the proposed mechanism. In the tree-structure social network, the
numbers represent the buyers, and the seller s is selling an item. The buyer 5 finally
wins the item after competing with another buyer 6.
utility of buyer 1 equals (popt1 (a
′)− pbase)α( 12 )d1 = 0.00345, the utility of buyer
5 equals v5−popt1 (a′) = 0.8−0.699 = 0.101, and the other utilities equal to zero.
5 Properties of FPDM
In this section, we first show that the seller’s expected revenue generated by our
mechanism is greater than that of the fixed-price mechanism without diffusion
and approaches the expected revenue of the extreme optimal case defined in
Section 3. Second, we prove that our fixed-price diffusion mechanism is individ-
ually rational. At last, we prove that our mechanism is incentive compatible.
Therefore, the seller is willing to apply our mechanism.
Theorem 2. The seller’s expected revenue generated by our mechanism is greater
than that of the fixed-price mechanism without diffusion; when the number of buy-
ers in the social network is infinity and α → 0, the former is at least 50% of
the extreme optimal case defined in Section 3. This bound is independent of the
structure of networks and is only related to the number of buyers in the network.
Proof. We first prove the first part of the theorem. According to the payment
policy of our mechanism, given the buyers’ action profile a′ ∈ F((n1, · · · , nk)),
the seller’s expected revenue generated by our mechanism equals
EFPDM =p
opt
1 (a
′)(1− popt1 (a′)k1)+
popt2 (a
′)popt1 (a
′)k1(1− popt2 (a′)k2) + · · ·+
poptx (a
′)popt1 (a
′)k1 · · · poptx−1(a′)kx−1(1− poptx (a′)kx).
By Equation (2), the seller’s expected revenue generated by the fixed-price
mechanism without diffusion equals
Ebase = (
x
1 + x
) · ( 1
1 + x
)
1
x .
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It is a tedious manipulation to compare EFPDM and Ebase. Without loss of
generality, we assume x = 2, k1 = 3, k2 = 2. Then
EFPDM = (
1
3
)
1
2 · (1− (1
3
)
3
2 ) + (
1
4
)
1
3 · (1
3
)
3
2 · (1− (1
4
)
2
3 )),
Ebase =
2
3
· (1
3
)
1
2 .
It is obvious that ( 13 )
1
2 · (1− ( 13 )
3
2 ) > 23 · ( 13 )
1
2 , so we have EFPDM > Ebase.
To prove the second part of the theorem, for simplicity, we further assume
that only one of the seller’s neighbours has descendants.Then, the seller’s ex-
pected revenue under our mechanism is
EFPDM =[1− ( 1
x
)
k−x+1
x−1 ](
1
x
)
1
x−1 +
(
1
x
)
k−x+1
x−1 [1− ( 1
k
)
x−1
k−1 ](
1
k
)
1
k−1 .
Again, following the Section 3, we know that Eopt = (
1
1+k )
1
k · ( k1+k ).
To compare EFPDM with Eopt, the curve of
EFPDM
Eopt
is depicted in Figure 2,
from which we see that EFPDM achieves at least 50% of Eopt. uunionsq
For a clearer understanding of the theorem, we consider two special cases.
0 10 20 30 40 50
x
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
y
Fig. 2. The curve of EFPDM
Eopt
when the number of buyers is infinity.
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5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
k
0.58
0.60
0.62
0.64
0.66
0.68
ExpectedRevenue
Fig. 3. The curves of EFPDM and Ebase when x = 5. The upper is the one of EFPDM
and the lower the one of Ebase.
1. The first case is one where the number of the seller’s neighbours is a con-
stant and where the number of buyers in the social network is infinity. For
convenience, we let x = 5 and fix α = 0.1.
From the Figure 3, we see that when k ≥ 5, the seller’s expected revenue gen-
erated by our mechanism is greater than that of the fixed-price mechanism
without diffusion, i.e., EFPDM > Ebase.
2. The second case is one where x = 5 and k → +∞, we compute the following
limitation
lim
k→+∞
EFPDM
Eopt
= lim
k→+∞
[1− ( 1x )
k−x+1
x−1 ] 1x
1
x−1 + 1x
k−x+1
x−1 [1− ( 1k )
x−1
k−1 ]( 1k )
1
k−1
( 11+k )
1
k ( k1+k )
=(
1
5
)
1
4 ≈ 67%.
We show the curve of Ratio = EFPDMEopt in this case in Figure 4, from which
we see that EFPDM is more than 66% of Eopt.
From the above two cases, it can be induced that the seller’s expected revenue
generated by our mechanism is not only greater than that of the fixed-price
mechanism without diffusion but also can achieve at least 66% of the extreme
optimal case defined in Section 3.
Next, we investigate the individual rationality of the proposed mechanism.
Theorem 3. The fixed-price diffusion mechanism is individually rational.
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0 50 100 150 200 250 300
k
0.66
0.68
0.70
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.78
0.80
y
Fig. 4. The curve of EFPDM
Eopt
, which approaches the horizontal line Ratio ≈ 0.67.
Proof. Given the buyers’ action profile a′ ∈ F((n1, · · · , nk)), we only need to
show that for all i ∈ K, it holds that
ui(a
′, (piFPDM , pFPDM )) ≥ 0
for all a′i = n
′
i.
From the definition of FPDM, for any buyer i ∈ K, without loss of generality,
we assume that i ∈ Xj(j = 1, · · · , x). Then we have
ui(a
′, (piFPDM , pFPDM )) = 0
ui(a
′, (piFPDM , pFPDM )) = vi − poptj (a′)
ui(a
′, (piFPDM , pFPDM )) = (poptj (a
′)− pbase)α(1
2
)di
According to the allocation policy of the mechanism, we have vi > p
opt
j (a
′),
so
ui(a
′, (piFPDM , pFPDM )) = vi − poptj (a′) > 0.
By the Theorem 2, we know that poptj (a
′) > pbase. Then following the defini-
tion of α and di, we get
ui(a
′, (piFPDM , pFPDM )) = (poptj (a
′)− pbase)α(1
2
)di > 0.
Therefore, we have ui(a
′, (piFPDM , pFPDM )) ≥ 0. uunionsq
Now we discuss the incentive compatibility of the fixed-price diffusion mech-
anism. Based on the model defined in Section 2, we only need to analyze the
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diffusion action of each buyer. We obtain the following theorem by proving that
for all buyers, diffusing the information to all their neighbours (i.e., n′i = ni)
maximizes their utilities, which means the mechanism incentivizes them to do
so.
Theorem 4. The fixed-price diffusion mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proof. Given the buyers’ action profile a′ ∈ F((n1, · · · , nk)), to prove that
FPDM is incentive compatible, we need to show that for each buyer i ∈ K
such that a′i 6= nil, diffusing the sale information to all i’s neighbours ni max-
imises i’s utility. We first classify all the buyers into three categories, then for
buyers in each category prove the theorem is true.
1. The buyer who receives the item, denoted by w.
2. All buyers on the path from the seller to w.
3. All buyers who are not included in the above two categories.
Category (1): Without loss of generality, we assume w ∈ Xj . Then when
reporting type truthfully, w’s utility is uw(a
′, (piFPDM , pFPDM )) = vw−poptj (a′),
which is independent of her diffusion action. Now when w misreports her type,
then her utility is also vw − poptj (a′). Therefore, the utility is not better than
reporting type truthfully. Therefore, reporting type truthfully maximizes w’s
utility.
Category (2): According to the notation introduced in Section 4, for each
buyer i in this category, we have i ∈ PHw, where w is the buyer who recieves the
item. Without loss of generality, we assume w ∈ Xj . When reporting type truth-
fully, the buyer i’s utility is ui(a
′, (piFPDM , pFPDM )) = (poptj (a
′)− pbase)α( 12 )di .
Since that poptj (a
′) = ( 11+k−j )
1
k−j , k−j is independent of i’s action, and pbase
and di are irrevalent to i’s action, we know that i’s utility is independent of her
action. When misreporting her type, then her utility does not change. Therefore
it is not worth misreporting type.
Category (3): For each buyer i in this category, her utility is 0. If i belongs
to the branch which the winner belongs to, diffusing the sale information to
all her neighbours makes i or her descendants have the chance to become the
winner, which increases i’s utility. Otherwise, i’s diffusing the sale information to
all her neighbours increases the number of buyers in the branch which i belongs
to, which creates the chance that her branch wins the item, and then i will have
the chance to become the winner or to stand in the path from the seller to the
winner, which increases i’s utility. Therefore, diffusing the sale information to
all her neighbours maximizes i’s utility.
Putting the above together, we know that the fixed-price diffusion mechanism
is incentive compatible. uunionsq
6 Conclusions
This paper designed a mechanism called fixed-price diffusion mechanism (FPDM)
for a seller to sell an item via a tree-structure social network. The mechanism
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helps the seller to attract more buyers by incentivizing buyers to invite each
other on the network. Under this mechanism, the seller’s revenue improvement
is guaranteed, which is at least 1/2 of the optimal revenue the seller can get with
the fixed-price mechanism. More importantly, the mechanism advances other
existing solutions in the sense that it is fix-priced and does not require buyers’
valuations to make the decision.
We have only considered tree-structure social networks in this paper. It would
be very interesting to look at the problem in a general network structure. We
have already had an idea to tackle this problem. Roughly speaking, we trans-
form the graph structure social network into one of tree structure by randomly
deleting some edges, which we will prove to maintain the properties of our mech-
anism. Another interesting topic would be to consider hiding the social network
structure from the seller as well. Lastly, there might exist other fixed-price mech-
anisms to further improve the seller’s revenue.
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